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Summary 
Jo his ~ssay the author deals with two topics: d iSJ~dv<~ntageous eff~t~ of 
the common Yugoslav state on the Croatian economy and rnisuppropri<lliou of 
the Yugoslav federal Stlltc property by Serbia. In the first Yugoslavia (between 
the two World Wars) Croatia was econotrucally handicapped through different 
political practices:. the mo.netary reform, taxing impar!ties, Serbian coloni7-a~ion 
m East~m Slavuuta Mel cltSnrlvantngeou~ trell tment 1n mfraf.tructurc constructiOn. 
In the socialist Yugoslavia this handicap was continued primarily through a 
poli'?' of industrial disinvestment. The economic reforms by Pnme Minister 
Ante. Markuvif in the late 1980s wuld nol save tlte Yugoslav federation , they 
even attempted to increase centralization, wh.ich was ina.~cccptablc for Croatia. 
Iu the second part of the Mtide the author offers a cnlcula tion of federal 
state property (mainly foreign cun·cm;y re.sel"\les and military property) 
'"!li!>appropriarcd . hy Serbia. On the basis of lMF ~ethodology .in calculating 
Croatian shnrc m the Yugoslav GNP lite aulltur ~ttmat<!S that the; uct value 
of the Croatian part of federal property amounts to 17 billion USD. 
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Among numerous rights, the United Nations Ch<~rter Hlso recognizes 
the category of natural right of a nation to self-defence. Raising the right 
to self-defence to the level of basic principles of the Charter is ao at-
tempt to express the right of any nation to its own country, its right to 
unite with other nations in a new state and its right to defend itself if it 
is fnrceu to remain in a state in which it is disadvantaged and which is 
generally unacceptable fo r the respective nation. 
In tbls respect, the Charter does not make m1y difference between the 
so ca lled historical and non-bistorie<~l nations, neither does it sanction as-
similation. The fact that some UN officials (for example, B. B. Galli) 
voice their fear that many new states may come into being in the near 
future is not an argument against the creation of new states, but proves 
that there are still a lot of individuals with a totalitarian atti.tude, who 
believe that the best of the worlds would be a s imple world with them, 
of course, in the driYing seat. 
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This is a statement typicll of the old t.:ulonial way of thinking. which 
has not yet n:ali?ed that the timt! (>f coerced melting pots of nations 
and internationally imposetl ruttion-building solutions h~ve long passed. This 
is why the emergence of nationalism in many nations does not su rprise, 
and ne::il her does the ir desirt: 10 create their own state. Moreove r, the 
practice has proved thai multinational states (in the sense of l>cveraJ po-
lnicaUy articulated nations living together in a common '\late) have not 
been '\uccessful. Most of them are experiencing interethnic friction result-
ing from the domimuion of one e thnic group over o rJJeTh, its insistance 
on their living together by iL\ own rules, which lA111sed the other ethnic 
groups to resist. Titil-1 is where the des in: for separation aml fu r the crea-
tion of their own sta te o riginate!-. II is not charactt:ristic only of relatiom. 
between ethnic groups whic.:h formed the former Yugoslavia. That wa the 
I.At'\e with or1ler multinational st:nes a!. well. 1 his can al!-u he found in 
o the r slates ch»rttcterized by civil homogeneity and it is only a mattet of 
timt:: when the conflicts will hreak out. 
Croatia euterctl the common state with Serbia with a great deal of 
optimism upon the disintegration of the 1\ustro-Hungarian Monarchy, ;tl-
though apart from political will (which late r proved to be a great political 
delusion) it hatl no o ther objective: economic.. cultural, '>piritual o r civilizll-
tional iuterest in doing so. Being a part of a tlrffe rent civilizatioual, eco-
nomic and cul tura l t::nviro nment Croa tia joined the common state far 
more developt::d lh;tn o ther joined regions. Croatia had a right to expect 
to improve its well-heing in rbe new sta te. Rm this did not t<tke place. 
ln'>tead of imptO\ing its well-being the re was disappointment. lnstead of 
development, a rip-off took plru:c. The new state stopped a t nothing. 
The first big rip-off hy the new statt:: took place wh t:: ll tbe new cur-
rency was being introduced. Defenuing the view tha t lhe old Serbian Llinar 
had been le · · devalued by the war than Ute Aus:tro-Hunga rian crown, the 
m!\\ state replaced the crown v.rirJJ the Yugoslav dinar at an incredibly low 
e:xchan~e m t t::. Fo r one old Yugu,Jav dinar, Croalian citizens had to pay 
five times more crowns lhtm Serbian citizenl> Serbian dinars. Then fo l-
lowed the second rip-nff when the new sta te imposed higher taxes on 
Croatian citizens than on Serbian citizens. F inally, lrea ting the new terri-
tory ru. t.:onquered areas, the new state started systematic t.:ulonization of 
Croatian areas \\ilh Serbian people, cspeciaJiy Sirmium and Eastern Sht-
vonia. It Wa!o. de fended with the need for agricuhural reform and with the 
need Lo give reward for "war merits" or so caiJed "Tiu.:ssalonians". How-
ever, the actu al gnal was the serbiza tion of the conquered areas. 
That was how it a ll began. Once the wheel started spinning, the rob-
bing never stopped. Grachwlly, state nti:-appropriation spn!ad to all area' 
of life. l'his \\3!. in panicular evident in the economy, where numerous 
state measmes were aimetl al elimina ting the obvious advantages of the 
western pnrl uf the new sta te ove r the eastern part . 
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AccOl'ding to R. Bicanic, enormous means were taken from Crolltian 
areas for investmen1s in Serbia and Belgrade. He supports his claim by 
figures. He gives numerous examples. One of them shows that at the 
time of the Yugoslavian kingdom 12 times as many railroads were built in 
Serbia than in Croati<~ , all hough the state treasury was filled mostly with 
tax money paid by Croatia. The same was true of customs duties, excise 
taxes and dues. (For more about the Croatian economic status in the 
Yugoslavian kingdom see in R. Bieanic., Ekonomsku podlogN hrvuL\'kog pi-
tanja, Zagreh, 191R). 
New circumstances and new ideology did nnL improve Croatia's posi-
tion. Although in World War 11 most fighters against fascism were Croa-
tians, due to I he existence of the lndependent State of Croatia, Croatian 
people were subjected to a merciless requital after the war. Even today 
Cruatians are condelUlled by some international factors for past events. 
This, too, bas " purpose. 
As communists in the so called socialist Yugoslavia used events from 
the past to elimiTiatt: any kind of criticism of the totalitarian government 
and of the distribution of Croatian property in other republics (often 
called less developed republics, which inc.luded Serbia), today the above 
mentioned international factors usc the same methods, being basically 
against the Croatian state. They cannot overcome the disintegration of 
former Yugoslavia am..l wouJd reestablish it if they could. But they cannot. 
However, they could create obstacles and cause problems and I his explains 
why they were so suprised to see Croatia survive and resi.c;t the military 
force which hau international support (even, until recently, of the US/\) 
to break any resistence by a force. 
How things were in former Yugoslavia can be seen from tbe following 
data. According to the structure of the gross investments in the post war 
era the largest investments were made in Serbia (36%), while in Croatia 
they were much smaller (23% ). 1\t the same time, Croatia participated 
with 27.5% in the GNP and Serhia participated with 25.7%. This is ac-
cording to official figures. H owever, the actual situation was even worse 
for Croatia. Numerous investments were made witl1 money not represented 
in the budget and money which was not officially documented as was the 
case with militaty industry. Militaty expenditure was kept in a separate 
account. The same was true of international arms trade. It is a well-
known fact that the former Yugoslavia hacl an annual turnover from arms 
sale of more than 2 billion dollars. However, this was not documented in 
offici<tl statistics. Arms were sold to Irac1 and Libya, given free of charge 
to Palestinians and international terrorism was supported. lt is a well-
known incident when a special JAT airplane from Belgrade landed in 
Rome, taking Abu Abas, the chief organiser of the terrorist attack on an 
ltalian passenger ship, which was taking tourists on a Mediterranean 
cruise. 
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There Wds no evidence as tu where this money ended up. One thing 
is fur sure - the money did not go to Croatia. Not a single arms and 
military equipm~nt plant was ever built in Croatia. 
There are many examplt!l\ proving bow diflienlt the posttton of Croatia 
in Mlcialist Yugoslavia was. But only now this kind of proof can be made 
public. lt wa-; nut possible befnn:. If somebody dared to do a thing like 
that, lhey would face a s trange "destiny". They would eml up in prison 
or would be prevented from doing their job by being accused of disrupt-
ing "fraternity and unity". And this was done merciJessly. The case of 
"Croatian spring" is weiJ-known, when many Croatians were persecuted. 
This was the time wben a significant number of university pro-fessors suf-
fereu. Some of them were sent to prison, others were prevented from 
public work, and s till others were not allowed to teach, although recdving 
saJary. 
/\nd so history was repeated. ln th~.: Yugoslav kingJom the accu~a-
tions of Croatians were based on " threatening national unity and slate se-
curity'', while in "socialist" YugoslaVIa they were based o n "di.,ruptmg fra-
ternity and unity". 
That lasted for 70 years. II was by no mt!ans a tempomry phenome-
non. Therefore, it was clea1· that changes were bound to take place at 
the first truly (rce elections amJ that a war was inevitable because Serbia 
would nut give up the territory, which was paying for most of its cA-
fK-11Ses. 
And the war came stormu1gly. The YugosJuv army starteJ r~n offensive 
in Croatia using all availahle means of modem warfare (<:onsisting of pre-
dominantly Russian and home pmducts), while Croatians defendt:tl them-
selves using makeshift arm. . Serbs who were Croatian citi7e ns, who had 
long hdore been givl.!n arms by the Yugoslav army, were instrumeu talized, 
too . T his was huw the appearance of an etbnic conflict and not of Ser-
bian aggn: sion against Croatia was continuously c-reated. 
PuntdoxicaiJy, the last government of former Yugoslavia had prepared 
Serbia economicaUy for the war against Croatia. That government wanted 
to patch up the economic and political -;ystem on the hasis of the t:un-
cepL<> of "new socialism'' or "sociali')m with a human face" (tJtoJ\e are slo-
gans from the then propag.mda). lt offered the concept of socialist re-
newal hased on market principles and the revival of the "sociali~L eco-
nomic system" by means of accumulated foreign currency rese;:rves and the 
suppo rt which bad been promised from abroad. 
The prime minister of that government, Ante MarkoviC, wanted to re-
new a unitarjan Yugoslavia. Hi c.oncept of ··socialis t market economy" 
was actually eliminating n:publics economically, due to extreme capi tal cen-
lraliz.ation as wd\ as the centralization of decision-making on the Yugoslav 
level. In this re. peel there was nn difference at <tiJ berween hi." and 
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Milo~eviC's eoncepts. The only point of difference ilo. the fact that 
MiJosevic advocated Great Serbia, while Markovic advocated a unitarian 
Yugoslavia. However, since thl! political and ecxmumic power was to b~.: 
concentrated in Belgrade, we can ccmsider the two concepts identicaJ. 1t 
was, after all, Markovic who directed tanks to the Slovenian border, hav-
ing been given support for th111 action by the USA. 
Markovic left the political scene, bu t all the money he had hrought to 
the stal t:: t reasury remained there to be used hy Se rbia . This is how 
Markovic pn1ctieally provided Serbia with large funds to finance the war 
ag3in'\l Croatia and other republics of former Yugoslavia. 
Apart from thTh. while the Yugo liiv government was ·till functioning 
''ith A. Markovic a prime minister, Serbia broke into the Yugoslav 
monemry ~>)'!.tcm. This happened at the end of 1990. Thi!. is where Serbia 
got hold of l bill ion and 250 million US dollars. Slovenians tnok 98 mil-
lion US dollars and Croatian. 70 million US dollars. 
Serbia was left with 16 billion and 654 million US dolla rs for conduct-
ing the war and aggr~ ion against Croatia. These are financi~l resources 
that arc operational at any time and this was dh-trihuted to different 
world banks. Formally, these huge sums of money (in Yugo ·lav circum-
. lances) were diStributed m .hown in the Table 1: 
Table 1: F inancial Resou rces of Former Yugoslavia 
- situation on December 31. 1990 
- in millions di:nar1; and US doUars (1 US dollar=10,567 YU dinars) 
•... · .·. ··:·:':·:· ·····.·•· -··~;;:<2:~' ,-·· ·•···dlnars · ·· ·· us d ollars ····•"' ·.·.·.· ·.·:·=·-:.::=·~ ·: .. 
National Hank of Yugoslavia 89, 197 8,422 
Reserves in foreign currency, gold and precious 
59,234 5,605 
metals 
.Property of Lhe 
Relations 
Yugoslav Bank for Tnlcmatiooal 
7,690 728 
Republic obligations towaTd the Yugoslav 
5,318 503 
monetary system 
lllegal intrusion in YU monet~ry system of L5,028 1,422 
some republics 
Property of the Post..tl Savings Bank 838 78 
Other funds 687 65 
Total 177,922 16,822 
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Serbia managed to stash away most of the cummon money of the 
formcr o;tate through varinu channels of different banks in guotl time. 
This is why it il> a1pnble of buying nnt tormer Yugoslavia' debts on the 
secondary market at mmimal price ·. 
According to dallt of the American Office for Foreig11 Affairs Control 
(Or/\C), Serbia has so far bought om through variuu" mediators 500 mil-
Lion dollars. 1 here is evidence that Serbia efficiently stashed away the 
property of the former state and that the blocade of its fimtncial propert) 
by the intcmi:itional community is extremely ineffit:ienl. 
Serbia has been buying out debts of former Yugoslavia wntrary to all 
standards nf international behavior. They represent the common property 
of the states that were established ou the ruins of fom1cr Yugoslavia. 
The international community has been aware of thL--. and despite the fact 
that the imernationaJ conununity denied Serbia 1he right of being the only 
successor of the fom1er state, it turneu il blind eye to !.uch transactions. 
Thus, it is eviu~nt that some i11h.:mational factors uo not folJow intema-
ttonal stundpoints they them:-clve" adopted. 
This is why exact figures concerning the total amount uf the debts that 
have been boughr out are rather uncen:un. lt i. also questionable whether 
the international blockadc of the fo rmer s tale's property has hcen effected 
in the firs t place. The United States might have done it, but have other 
states which p<trticipah:d in the decision on tltt: blockade done it H'> well'? 
Furthermore, it is unde<tr how much money is under Lhc concrol of the 
international c...·nmmunity, and how will other sucre :-ors get hold of the 
property they have a right to. 
This helps unucrstand the Serbian president's insist;mce on immediate 
and complete lifting of the cmhargo towards Scrhia and on recog11iling in-
ternatiunnl-legal continuity of the new stale called Yugoslavia, which wa 
formed by Serbia ami Montenegro in order to stan any kind of negotia-
tion on the peaceful reintegration into Croatia of the areas occupied by 
St:rhia. 
In the war against Croatia Serbia also used nther property of former 
Yugoslavia. For the Conference on former Yugoslavia, international experts 
e:-timated its property to around 95 billion dollars. IL-. biggest portion il> 
military property, whtch is more: than 71 billion dollars. Mo t of thiS 
properly remained at Serbia's disposal. Tahle 2 indicates the itbove thesis. 
When the value: of the total property is cleareu of debts, an amount 
of 59 bUiion dollars remain., which has by most part been at Serbia's 
disposal. The exact amount Serbia snatched is presently hard to establli h. 
However, estimates can be made. Military property i most easily esti-
mated. It is it fact that no movables of some value have remained in 
Croatia. Everything, that could be 1:-~ken away was taken away. What could 
not he tnken away was ucstroyed. 
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The report nf the expert team fur the first time reveals figures on 
former Yugoslavia's debts. 1L was treated as slriclly confidential informa-
tion, the only Lbing whtch was tli'\cw sed was the capital, and this was 
tlone depending on th~ situation. 1 he actual debts were unkn0\\11 to the 
citizen of Lhe former st:ue. 
Tr~h/t; 2: Estimation of Properly and Debts of Former Yugoslavi:l 
-on December 31. 1990 




_--,:c .= dio:ns• ... us dollars ........ ~: ;;;~ 
Financial resomces 215,000 20,346 
Federa l government _property 15,000 1,420 
Other propeny 3,000 284 
Militarv properly 734,000 71.354 
lnfrastructu rc 19,000 1,798 
Total properry 997,000 95.193 
Total <.lebts 374,000 35,393 
Net va lue of total property 629,000 58,957 
• The amounll> bave been rounded which at."CCunts for certain different:\:~ in sums 
TnLt:mationnl debts of formt:r Yugoslavia amounting to 16 billion dollar 
were occHsioually discussed. I lowever , Imlay it is obvious thai Lht: identi-
fied debt of the form t:r state was 35.4 billion uollars, which means lh<~ L 
t:very third doiJar of the former Yugoslavia's property was u11der interna-
tional mon gage. Total debts against property arc around 37.2%, which is 
characteristic of extremely indebted countries. Thu!., the former state hn' 
left num<!rous prob lems in different :1reas to its successon.. Therefore, the 
process of succe..o,;sicm will be extremely complex and it will defmitely nOL 
be completed soon. 
However, according to the known t'ru.:ts, it is a lready possible 10 make 
an objective estimation, which might iJJustrate futurt: developments. 
Once tbe process of succe-.-.inn i started, the propeny uivi ion plan 
made by the Jntemntional Monetary Fund might be taken as a <.:ritcrinn. 
The need for division emerged when the Fund decidetl to accept Cro~tja 
and Slovenia, sovereign states established upon the disintegration of Yugo-
slavi<~, as tts full members. 
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· In accordance with this neeJ , the Fund applied the participation of 
former Yugoslav republics io the GNP nf former Yugoslavia a.s a division 
criterion. The scheme of the criterion is. ba!-~d on values given in per-
centages as follows: 
Table 3: Total Obligations of Former Yugoslavia and their Division 
- division executed on December 14, L992 
Former Yugoslavia 100.00 
Croatia 28.49 
Bosnia-1 fercegovim1 13.20 
Slovenia 16.39 
Macedonia SAO 
Serhi11 and Montenegro 36.52 
According to the above division, Croatia participates in ohligt~tions of 
former Yugoslavia toward the Fund with 28.49% . ApplyiJ1g the same key, 
Croatian property in total financial property can he separated rrom the 
total property and total debts of former Yugo~l<~via. 
Table 4: Division of Financial Property of Forrnt!r Yugoslavia According to 
IMF Criterion 
- in millions US doUars (l US dollar=10,567 YU dinars) 
Former Yu_goslavia 16,822• 




Serbia and Montencg:ro 6,165 
•The amounts have bl;cn rounded, which accouu~ for certain differences in ~urn.-. 
Croatia was, accordingly, robbed of 4 billion ;md 793 million doJiarl>, 
which belong to it according to the given criterion. This amount is a .:.ol.id 
base for linancing an army of 200,000 people thrt)ughout a long period of 
timt;. This wou ld mean 23,964 US dollars per each active soldier. The 
Mllela. V. 1.1~ Propo.rty -· f'olot. ITOS80. Vol lOOCII. (1995). tin. S. pp. 181 - 172 169 
misappropriated financial property of other former rcpuhlics amounting to 
about 5 billion and 907 million dollars. which is 29,535 US dollar per ac-
tive oldier, should be added here. We hould al'\0 add resources of Ser-
bia and Montenegro. amounting to about 6 billion and 165 million US 
dollars, which makes additional 30,826 US dollars per soldie r. The IOIItl 
amount Serbia had on its disposal was 84,325 US dollar:. per active sol-
dier. 
Dut this is not a ll. Serbia had most of tbe rema ining pro perty on its 
disposal. Owing to international factors Serb ia was a llowed to pull out 
most of the military property from Croatia, which was la ter used in the 
aggression against Croalia. 
What this is all about is shown in data collected for negotiation on 
the succession nf fnm1er Yugoslavia. The participation uf Croatia in tbe 
t:Stimated property and debts uf fomter Yugoslavia, which 'vas hascd un 
the criterion of the International Monetary Fund, i . bown in the 1 able 
5. 
Table 5: Croatia's Participation in the bstimated P roperty ami D ebts of 
' 
Former Yugoslavia 
estimation made of December 3 1, 1990 
in millions of US dollars ( I US dollnr= 10,567 YU dinars) 
accon.liug to £MF division criterion 
. ' E. ~;t' F~'" J;: ·- ,,,,, ~=~ntffll~r:ly of c e "':w.<JtbatiatX · __ ;_,L~~-:=r~t .4,· ···'7'~~ ,, ·:;;;;·. . .... X.~ . fo:ciiiey: ·· Y U:itoslavia Mnafti(jj,ai'i<m 
Fmancial property 20.346. 5.796 
Financial debts 35.393 IO.OR3 
Federal government nroperty 1A20 -'05 
Other property 284 Rl 
Military property 71.354 20.329 
infrastructure 1.798 512 
Total property 95. 193 27.120 
Tntal debts 35.393 10.01)3 
Net value of to ta l property 58.957 16.797 
'Tbe amounlli huve bee.o rounded, which accounts for certain differences iu ~um.s 
Of the total amount of fanner Yugoslavia is property, Croatia claims 
27 billion anti 120 million US dollars. If Cmatia's portion of former 
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Yugoslavia 's debts is tktlncted (rom this amount, then Croatia claims Ill 
biWon 797 millinn dolla rs. 
Om: should bear in mim.l that this is an estimation based on informa-
tion available on D ecember 31, 1990. The estimation is not complete be-
caw e not all the elements were taken into accow1L There are still many 
undefined items of hidcfen property which could nm be identified by that 
time. For exa mple, claims towan..ls a thi rd party are not given in the cal-
cu lation, especia lly those concerning lraq, Libya antl the former USSR ( il.s 
successors resp~.:ctively). As fa r as we know, in its trade excha11g:c with the 
fom1 ~.: r USSR, former Yugo. lavia had a surplus of l.R billion US d ollars. 
Serbia unilaterally compensated this amount hy buying MlG 29 figh ter jcto; 
and o the r miliuuy equipment dc:spitc the international embargo. 
This is why it is q uilt: certain rbat the value of former Yugoslavia's 
property will he enlarged by new findin~;,rs. However. it is a.ln;atly clear 
that in the new c.alc.ula tio n Croa tia's balance will be dd'init t~ly positive and 
claims towards Serbia ~md ot11e r states fo rmed on Yugoslavia's ruins. 
This will he particularly evident in paying off former Yugoslavia's debts. 
Although the calcula ted participation of Croatia in to tal debts of the for-
mer state make' more than JO billion dnllars, the actua l amount can b) 
no means he tha t large. It ha.., to he significantly smalle r, simply due to 
the fact that investment). in C roa tia based 011 i11te roational loans w~Jrc fa r 
beyond the average investments in other regions of fo rmer Yugoslavia, 
which can he easily documented. 
We can expect diffic.:ulty only when it come to unidentifiable debts as 
was the case with the deposit (membership quota) and debts towards the 
International 1onetary Fund. This is not the Ul\e with the World Bank. 
H ere it is ab o lutcly clear who the loan user is, so it is po. sible to de-
fine the obligations. Also, when it comes to comrocrdal credits, the beue-
ficiary and the debtor is known . 
Debt payment solidarity is unacceptabh.:. Although international cre dito rs 
currently rnsi'lt on this (it see1111> to be the main reason fo r the disruption 
of negotiations with the Pa ri Club), argument" a re in favou r or C roa tia. 
Croatia is really nul obligated to accept solidari ty in paying off someth.ing 
that o thers "pent. 
It is a well-known fHct tha t Croatia'. total fo reign credit-; were the 
sma llest. During the period of " living togethe r" in fo rm er Yugoslavia 
Groalill was treate.d as a t.lcveloped republic autl internationa l cret.lits were 
mostly used for financing investments in less developed repuhlics and the 
province of Ko).ovo. ln o ther wurtl.· fo re ign credits were used predomi-
nantly fur financing the development of Kosovn, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herce-
govina and in the latest period fo r financing the development of Serbia 
proper (Serbia without Kosovo and Voivodina). because it reccivcd the 
status of an unde rdeveloped region hy a federa l decisiou made in the late 
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etghues. Serbia's pre ent debt:. are the biggest due to the fact that 
Ku<,uvo, where most foreign inve tmenl~ were made, became an integral 
pan of it 
FinaUy, another fact throwing more light on Croatia's position in fur· 
mer Yugoslavia and demonstrating the reason why Scrhia militarily at· 
tacked Croatia should be nutl!d. Croatia (andl Slovenia) were continuously 
fimmcing Jifferent expenses from the military and government administra-
tion to various officus and a large bureaucracy (more than 47 lhnusand 
only in the so ca lled federal administralinn). 
l~rom 1945 lo 1990 Ll1e Croatia 's share in the population of former 
Yugoslavia fell from 23.2% to 19.6% . to the same period, Croatia's par-
licipHiiun in the industrial production of former Yugoslavia fell from 
292% m 21.6%. Al'><l, employment fe ll. compared to o ther former repub· 
lies, from 27.2% to 23.5% ami ut the arne rtime Croatia bad lhe large~l 
number of emigrants. Other indicators from thi' period are unfavorable 
for Croalia. too. However, em Lhe other band, Croatia 's financial parlici· 
paliun in th~ so called common affairs and in frnancing the so called in-
sufficienlly developed rt:publics and provinces was the higgest. 
If we use the above mentioned c~timation of the International Mone-
lary Fund saying, that Croatia's panicipation in former Yugoslavia's GNP 
was 28.49% and C<.lmparc this to former Yugoslavia ·s GNP for the en tin: 
post war period, it wilJ brings us lhe value of Croatia's GNP. Since 
Croa tia pa rlicipau..:Ll in tl1e so called federal expenditure lhrnugh taxes, 
customs duties and dues with 15% of its GNP, and with 5% of its GNP 
through financial manipulations of the National Bank of Yugoslavia and 
through Yugo~Javia'~ non-budget balance, tbis amounts to 20% nf its GNP 
and the amount of Croatia's money ending u_p in the ·•common" treasury 
in the 45-year-period can be easily estimated. 
According to intcmalinnaJ statistics, former Yugo.lavia's Gl\T wm.. II 
billio n US dollars in 1945. In 1965 il wal> 45 billion US dollars and in 
1985 it was 63 billion US dollars. In the next five y~m there was so in-
crease of the G P hec.:au.sc it was a time of extreme stagnation of the 
fonuer Yugoslavia's economy. lt was the heginning nf the end and a time 
of lhe inability of the Yugoslav rulers to stabilize generally the economic 
and political situation by reform. This is why in 1990, the year of the 
first reaUy free elections, the former Yugoslavit~'s GNP was as high as 63 
biJiion US dollars. 
ln the las t 45 years the average annual fom1cr Yugoslavia's GNP was 
40 hillinn US tlollars. According to the international Monetary Fund's key, 
Croatia participated in the fnrmt!r Yugoslavia's GNP with 28.49%, which is 
II billion and 396 million US dollars. As 20% of lntal former Yugosla-
via's expenditure was paid by Croatia, it turns out that Croatia annually 
paid into the fedcrdl budget 2 billion and 275 million US dollars. For the 
last 45 years it makes 102 hilliun and 375 million US dollars. 
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This is an extremely large amounl in Croatia's circum1-tances. lt would 
be as large <10 amount even for more developed countries. This amount 
was not compensated in any way as some 'cern 10 suggest. It was not 
compensated hy profits made in th~ former Yugo lavia's market, simply 
beca use Yugoslavia's mark~l did not have any significance for Croatia. 
World trade exchange was always more important for Crmttia than trade 
exchange with 1he republics of former Yugoslavia, and Serbia in particular. 
Of the total GNP Croatia traded only two ten in the market uf former 
Yugoslavia, more than a tenth of which concerns Slovenia. The percentage 
was nul higher than 7 perucnt of GNP when it came to trade exchange 
with Serbia, and not higher than five percent with Bosnia and Herze-
govina. These <tre statistics which e<~n be easily checked. 
This is a ll to explain that Croatia had no economic reason.' for being 
a pan of former Yugoslavia. It was the other way around, the economic 
reasons '>poke against that 'togetherness'. Today Cro:.Hia could have been 
high ly developed country in any respect had it not been tak~n away more 
than 100 billion dollars in the last 45 years. lt could have built a network 
of highways and a modern industry of the kind typical of mall '\lates. lt 
cou ld have attracted more tourists to it beautiful coa'>L It could havc 
been a modem state in any respect instead of now facing huge dt: .. •\truc-
tion, unemployment aml tbe problem of displaced peo ple. 
These facts ~liminate any possibility of creating a new synthetic slu te. 
The international public anti advocates of such an idea shouJd he well 
aware of these facts. 
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